Racial diversity in private capital fundraising
with Josh Lerner and Emmanuel Yimfor
R&R Journal of Financial Economics

Black- and Hispanic-owned (B&H) groups managed only 3.5% of U.S. private capital funds raised between 2015 and 2020. We trace B&H managers through the fundraising lifecycle to understand where barriers emerge. At entry, first-time B&H VC funds raise 31 to 47% less capital than comparable non-B&H funds. PE funds face no such barrier. First-time B&H VC funds raise less and do not outperform, inconsistent with standard tests of taste-based discrimination.  Conditional on performance, B&H managers are 26% more likely to raise follow-on funds. What explains barriers at entry but success thereafter? We find evidence of investor preferences: public pensions are twice as likely to invest in B&H funds despite no superior screening ability, and B&H fundraising surged after George Floyd's murder but partially reversed amid anti-DEI backlash. Yet pensions concentrate their B&H allocations in PE and follow-on funds, perhaps reflecting reputational concerns, leaving first-time VC undersupported. These patterns have consequences for the funding of entrepreneurs; B&H managers are 20 percentage points more likely to back B&H founders.

Venturing into racial diversity on startup boards
with James Weston and Emmanuel Yimfor
R&R Management Science

Social movements have reshaped public company governance, but whether they influence private companies remains unknown. We provide the first large-scale evidence on startup board diversity following the 2020 George Floyd (GF) protests. Using a novel dataset with racial classifications for startup directors, we document that Black director appointments nearly doubled, from 1.6% to 3.1%, with the largest increases in outsider and insider roles. Startups interacting with capital markets or located in areas with intense protests responded more, suggesting institutional investors transmitted social pressure to private firms. Despite the increase, startups maintained consistent selection standards: GF-era and pre-GF Black directors had comparable qualifications, and early evidence shows no adverse career outcomes for GF-era startup appointees. Public firms, by contrast, sharply increased first-time appointees, who later struggled to secure new seats. Since VC-backed startups seed nearly half of U.S. public companies, these findings show how social norms are transmitted through private markets that shape the pipeline of future corporate leadership. 

The dynamics of pay-for-performance sensitivity in private equity funds

I explore the dynamics of pay-for-performance sensitivity in private equity funds. Carried interest gives private equity fund managers 20% of fund profits, conditional on beating a hurdle rate. Consequently, early deal successes (failures) put the fund in (out of) the carry, making pay for performance close to 20 cents on the dollar (zero). I document that companies acquired in buyouts grow faster when acquired by funds that have a higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. The effect is stronger when explicit incentives are expected to be more important. I find similar results using exogenous variation in pay-for-performance sensitivity due to public market movements. My findings provide evidence of the importance of incentives for value creation in private equity.

Managerial ownership and firm performance: Evidence from private equity

I examine the relationship between managerial ownership and operational performance for firms acquired in a buyout. I show that high post-buyout CEO ownership stakes are associated with improved firm profitability. This result is economically stronger for changes in ownership stakes, and is solely present when the CEO is retained. Ownership stakes are higher when initial profitability is low and is associated with cost cutting. Overall, the results support the view that improving managerial incentives is an important part of value creation in buyouts.

Liquidity provision in the secondary market for private equity fund stakes
with Rui Albuquerque, Ludovic Phalippou, and Enrique Schroth

We estimate the demand for private equity fund stakes in the secondary market using a broker's proprietary data on bids. We show that the demand response to aggregate liquidity shocks is negatively related to contemporaneous bids, and this relationship is stronger for funds that most likely are put for sale in times of low liquidity. We also show that the demand response to aggregate liquidity shocks is unrelated to future NAV-to-NAV returns and to future bidding behaviour. These results are consistent with the variation in discounts in private equity stakes being linked to the variation in liquidity provision in the secondary market for private equity.

Carried interest
In: Cumming, D., Hammer, B. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Private Equity. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38738-9_58-2